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The British government under Prime Minister Boris Johnson yesterday secured a
prorogation of Parliament from the Queen. Barring an intervention from the courts,
Parliament will stand prorogued no earlier than Monday 9th September and no later
than Thursday 12th September 2019 to Monday 14th October 2019. The Cabinet
Manual defines prorogation as the conclusion of the parliamentary session and a
recess causing an effective suspension of the parliamentary process. Prorogation is
related to a further concept that should be distinguished in this context: adjournment.
Adjournment refers to the right of each House of Parliament to interrupt and continue
at a later time its current session, for instance at the end of each day and for periods
of time determined by resolution. This typically occurs during ‘conference season’
as MPs adjourn Parliament in order to give members time to attend their respective
party conferences. The crucial difference is that Parliament remains in control of the
process, not the government. 
As I laid out in an earlier contribution to this blog, prorogation effectively eliminates
Parliament as a constitutional actor for the relevant time period. Given the events of
yesterday, I will have to revisit my characterisation of the constitutional convention
on prorogation. I still believe that achieving a no deal Brexit by silencing and
marginalising Parliament is fundamentally at odds with British parliamentary
democracy, especially principles of democracy and representative and responsible
government. Prorogation deprives Parliament of any ability to fulfil its deliberative
and legislative function, and crucially to hold the government to account for its
exercise of prerogative powers. However, in this post I will not attempt to restate that
argument or develop it further. Instead, I want to draw attention to a constitutional
threat lurking in the background of the prorogation.
Progogation act 1867
Much attention yesterday focused on the timing of the prorogation. The government
evidently sought to avoid the impression that the sole, or indeed primary goal
of the prorogation was to cut short the time for parliamentary debate of Brexit.
For many commentators the weeks from now until 12 September and from 14
October to 31 October (the day the United Kingdom exits the European Union) were
crucial. It tipped the balance of the prorogation from blindingly unconstitutional to
constitutionally dubious, but permissible. Regardless of whether one finds this line
of reasoning convincing, there is a threat that this prorogation can be extended
indefinitely that has been largely overlooked: the Prorogation Act 1867.
Section 1 of the Act specifies that the recess period may be extended for at least
a further fourteen days after the date of the proclamation by the Monarch on the
advice of the Privy Council. This provision effectively permits the government to
extend the prorogation of Parliament in the same manner that it secured the original
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prorogation. Historically, this last occurred in 1950, when Parliament was prorogued
to a later day while in recess by George VI. Section 2 appears to limit this power by
stating that ‘This Act shall not apply to the case of the prorogation of Parliament at
the close of a session.’ A session is a parliamentary year and normally commences
in spring, lasting for about 12 months and ending with a prorogation. Typically, there
are five sessions in each Parliament. 
Is the prorogation secured by the government under PM Johnson ‘at the close of a
session’ and hence of the type covered by section 2 of the Prorogation Act? In purely
technical terms the answer is yes, but that is because any prorogation by definition
closes a session and is therefore ‘at the close of a session’. This is regardless of
how long it has lasted and whether it facilitates a general election. It appears this
interpretation captures too much as all prorogations would be covered and section 1
would therefore have no sphere of application. A purely technical interpretation then
does not clarify matters as it cannot account for the extension that occurred in 1950.
Therefore, we require alternative interpretations of section 2 of the Prorogation Act
and I suggest there are at least two, with different legal implications. 
One interpretation is that section 1 of the Prorogation Act only applies to a
prorogation brought about in preparation for a general election. A prorogation for
the purposes of a general election is different from a typical prorogation because
it can arise at any point during the parliamentary year. It does not, or at least not
necessarily, arise ‘at the close of a session’, nor is closing the session its primary
motivation. In the past, a general election would be held at the discretion of the
government as shaped by constitutional convention and now additionally tempered
through the provisions of the Fixed Term Parliament Act. Section 2 may have been
designed to prevent section 1 of the Prorogation Act from applying in the scenario
we are currently facing. The prorogation sought by the government was clearly not
meant to facilitate a general election, even though it may well lead the UK down
that path. Instead, the government has claimed that it is primarily concerned with
closing the session of Parliament and laying out a legislative agenda in the Queen’s
speech. 
However, there is an alternative interpretation of section 2 that only excludes
the application of section 1 to a prorogation sought at the end of a parliamentary
year, after roughly twelve months. This interpretation would leave any prorogation
that does not arise at the end of a parliamentary year unaffected: including one
facilitating a general election, but also a prorogation effected during the ordinary
course of a parliamentary session for other political ends. Applying this interpretation
to our situation is complicated by the fact that the current session of Parliament has
already lasted for more than twelve months, an unusually long two years. One could
argue that as it is not an ordinary prorogation, in the sense of arising after twelve
months and primarily motivated by closing a parliamentary session and is therefore
not covered by section 2 of the Prorogation Act.  
This may not strike everyone as the most convincing interpretation, I myself have
doubts, but this uncertainty over whether the application of the Prorogation Act is
excluded by section 2 in our circumstances may be enough to secure an extension.
The danger is not primarily grounded in the legal power potentially given to the
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government: indeed, whether or not section 2 applies may in the end not be decisive
as long as the government can make an arguable case to the Queen that it has
these powers. This is because any legal challenge against an extension under
the Prorogation Act would face the same difficulties experienced by the current
litigation against prorogation. While it is possible to challenge the ministerial advice
offered to the Queen, the exercise of prerogative powers through the Monarch is not
amenable to juridical review. Should the Queen act on the ministerial advice (even if
it is unlawful) and extend the prorogation period it will be extremely difficult to undo. 
The threat of prorogation to parliamentary democracy is obvious. There is no legal
guarantee that the government will allow Parliament to sit again following prorogation
in September. It seems at least possible for the government to argue that it can
legally seek an extension of the recess period beyond 14 October. I make no
prediction whether such an extension is politically feasible or indeed likely. 
Hopefully, once the current crisis has settled down, a debate can begin about
whether prorogation is still needed in the constitutional framework of the UK and
whether it should be put on a statutory footing to temper the political abuse we have
recently witnessed. In any case, it would appear that prorogation has morphed from
a politically uncontroversial and predictable formality into a blunt tool that enables
politically opportune silencing of Parliament in service of the government agenda.
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